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Anarchy, Status Updates, and  
Utopia 
 
James Grimmelmann* 
 
Social software has a power problem.1  Actually, it has two.  
The first is technical.  Unlike the rule of law, the rule of soft-
ware is simple and brutal: whoever controls the software 
makes the rules.  And if power corrupts, then automatic power 
corrupts automatically.  Facebook can drop you down the 
memory hole; PayPal can garnish your pay.  These sovereigns 
of software have absolute and dictatorial control over their do-
mains. 
Is it possible to create online spaces without technical 
power?  It is not, because of social software’s second power 
problem.  Behind technical power, there is also social power.  
Whenever people come together through software, they must 
agree which software they will use.  That agreement vests 
technical power in whoever controls the software.  Social soft-
ware cannot be completely free of coercion—not without ceas-
ing to be social, or ceasing to be software. 
Rule-of-law values are worth defending in the age of soft-
ware empires, but they cannot be fully embedded in software 
itself.  Any technical design can always be changed through an 
exercise of social power.  Software can help by making this co-
ercion more obvious, or by requiring more people to join togeth-
er in it, but software alone cannot fully protect users.  Whatev-
er limits make social software humane, free, and fair will have 
 
*  Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of 
Law.  I presented earlier versions of these ideas to the Technology and Intel-
lectual Property Group Conference at the University of Toronto in March 
2008 and at the Governance of Social Media Workshop at Georgetown Uni-
versity in November 2011. My thanks for their comments to the attendees, 
and to Aislinn Black, Brandy Karl, and Timothy B. Lee.  This essay may be 
freely reused under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 In-
ternational license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. 
1. Social software is “software that supports group interaction.”  Clay 
Shirky, A Group Is Its Own Worst Enemy, CLAY SHIRKY’S WRITINGS ABOUT THE 
INTERNET (July 1, 2003), http://www.shirky.com/writings/group_enemy.html. 
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to come from somewhere else—they will have to come from We 
the Users. 
 
I.      Technical Power 
 
The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall . . . 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”2  But the Fifth Amendment doesn’t apply to social soft-
ware.  Just ask Marc Bragg.  He was a player in Second Life,3 
where almost anything you can imagine can be brought to life 
with a little sculpting, a little painting, and a little program-
ming.4  Like many other players, Bragg wanted a parcel of vir-
tual land to make his home.  On April 30, 2006, he won a land 
auction, paying $300 for a parcel named Taessot.5  Two days 
later, though, Bragg received a warning from Second Life’s 
administrators, alleging fraud in the auction.6  At this point, a 
normal government could have taken him to court to set the 
sale aside.  But Second Life doesn’t have a normal government. 
The one it has rules by software.  Second Life’s administrators 
went into its database of land titles and took Marc Bragg’s 
name off the records for Taessot, instantly ousting him from 
possession and locking him out.7  And then, as if to further 
prove who was boss, Second Life took away all his other land as 
well—and sold it at auction to the highest bidder.8  So much for 
“property” and “due process of law.” 
Or ask Vi Hart, a “recreational mathemusician,” who cre-
ates stop-motion videos that mix obsessive doodling with 
whimsical soundtracks to explore mathematics in an inviting 
hands-on way.9  She posted her videos to YouTube, where she 
 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
3. SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
4. See Complaint at 2, Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., No. 06-08711 
(Chester Cnty. Pa. Ct. Comm. Pl. Oct. 4, 2006), removed, 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 
(E.D. Pa. 2007). 
5. Id. at 20. 
6. Id. at 21. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. at 22. 
9. Kenneth Chang, Bending and Stretching Classroom Lessons to Make 
Math Inspire, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at D3. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
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has over 800,000 subscribers and millions of views.10  But then 
Google merged its Google+ social network with YouTube, re-
quiring a Google+ account to post comments on YouTube.11  
The move encouraged more people to use the struggling 
Google+, but it also displaced fans’ voices in favor of “popular 
G+ users . . . . a very small segment of mostly male, profession-
al, egotistical, entitled people” who leave distracting and har-
assing comments.12  This put Vi Hart and everyone like her to 
an unpleasant choice: start using Google+ and its incoming 
wave of haters, or give up on YouTube entirely.  As she ex-
plained, 
 
I invested so much into my YouTube channel, 
and they’re taking that investment and threaten-
ing to throw it away if I don’t also start investing 
in Google+.  No thank you Google, but you’ve al-
ready made me regret investing so much into you 
the first time.  Do you really think I’m going to 
do it again? . . . . Making huge forced changes to 
a platform is problematic for people whose liveli-
hood depends on certain things being a certain 
way.  I would not recommend making YouTube 
or Google+ a large part of your business . . . . 13 
 
Or take Mailpile, a project to create a “modern, fast web-
mail client with user-friendly encryption and privacy fea-
tures.”14  It carried out an online fundraiser, bringing in 
 
10. See Vi Hart, Videos, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/user/Vihart/videos (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
11. See Nundu Janakiram & Yonatan Zunger, We Hear You: Better 
Commenting Coming to YouTube, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2013/09/youtube-new-comments.html. 
12. Hank Green, HANK’S TUMBLR (Nov. 8, 2013), 
http://edwardspoonhands.com/post/66425515182/ok-so-my-friend-emma-puts-
this-video-of-her. 
13. Vi Hart, Google+ YouTube Integration: Kind of Like Twilight, Except 
in This Version When +Cullen Drinks BellaTube’s Blood They Both Become 
Mortal, But +Cullen Is Still an Abusive Creep, Also It Is Still Bad, VI HART 
(Nov. 12, 2013), http://vihart.com/google-youtube-integration-kind-of-like-
twilight-except-in-this-version-when-cullen-drinks-bellatubes-blood-they-
both-become-mortal-but-cullen-is-still-an-abusive-creep-also-it-is-still-bad/. 
14. Mailpile – Let’s Take E-mail Back, INDIEGOGO, 
3
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$163,192 and 54 Bitcoins.15  But $45,000 of those donations 
came through PayPal,16 which froze the money, refusing to let 
Mailpile have it until the developers provided “an itemized 
budget and your development goal dates for your project.”17  
Only after a wave of online bad publicity did PayPal release the 
funds.18  PayPal has a “long history of similar things;”19  it has 
blocked fundraisers for WikiLeaks20 and Bradley Manning.21 
This is not the place to reargue these cases. Indeed, even 
calling them “cases” is a misnomer.  In the first instance—
before Bragg, Hart, and Mailpile were deprived of their rights 
and privileges within Second Life, YouTube, and PayPal—
there was no litigation at all. The companies simply modified 
the software on which their platforms ran, and that was it: 
Bragg’s land was gone, Hart was stuck with Google+ boors, 
Mailpile’s money was inaccessible. 
They were all victims of technical power: the authority ex-
ercised over any software-mediated space by the person or enti-
ty that controls the software.  Code is law, and the platform op-
erator controls the code.  A few tweaks to settings in a database 
can banish a user, silence her, or confiscate all her digital 
 
http://www.indiegogo.com/projects/mailpile-taking-e-mail-back (last visited 
Oct. 13, 2014).  See also MAILPILE, http://www.mailpile.is (last visited Oct. 13, 
2014). 
15. See Mailpile: Donate, MAILPILE, https://www.mailpile.is/donate/ (last 
visited Oct. 13, 2014). 
16. See Lee Hutchinson, PayPal Freezes $45,000 of Mailpile’s Crowd-
funded Dollars, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 5, 2013, 10:33 AM) 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/09/paypal-freezes-45000-of-mailpiles-
crowdfunded-dollars/. 
17. Brennan, PayPal Freezes Campaign Funds, MAILPILE (Sept. 5, 2013), 
http://www.mailpile.is/blog/2013-09-
05_PayPal_Freezes_Campaign_Funds.html. 
18. See Mike Masnick, Insanity: PayPal Freezes Mailpile's Account, De-
mands Excessive Info to Get Access, TECHDIRT (Sept. 5, 2013, 9:33 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130905/08233824411/insanity-paypal-
freezes-mailpiles-account-demands-excessive-info-to-get-access.shtml. 
19. Id. 
20. See Kevin Poulsen, PayPal Freezes WikiLeaks Account, WIRED (Dec. 
4, 2010, 3:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/paypal-
wikileaks/. 
21. See PayPal Cuts Service to Alleged WikiLeaks Whistle-Blower Sup-
port Effort, FREE CHELSEA MANNING (Feb. 24, 
2011), http://www.chelseamanning.org/news/paypal-cuts-service-to-alleged-
wikileaks-whistle-blower-support-effort.   
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
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goods.  Virtual worlds, social networks, and payment proces-
sors hold technical power.  So do Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) such as Comcast, web hosts such as Tumblr, and the 
millions of other middlemen who run the systems on which the 
Internet runs. 
Technical power gives rise to a distinctive anxiety: the God 
problem. The exercise of legal power, no matter how dictatorial, 
is restrained by the fact that any legal threats must be carried 
out by humans, fallible humans. They can be bribed, persuad-
ed, seduced, overwhelmed, or distracted. Legal power can be 
resisted, passively or violently.  But technical power cannot: 
those who wield it are as gods.  PayPal changed a status field 
in the database entry corresponding to Mailpile’s account and 
that was that. Mailpile’s money was beyond its reach. Google 
combined Google+ and YouTube overnight, without so much as 
a hearing or a notice in the Federal Register. Second Life fore-
closed on Taessot and ousted Bragg from possession with a few 
keystrokes.  Mortgage lenders can only dream of such reme-
dies.  These software monarchs have metaphysical jurisdiction 
over their domains—absolute control over what happens, over 
what exists.22 
 
II.      Social Power 
 
But focusing on technical power raises its own question: 
why didn’t Marc Bragg and Mailpile head for the exit when 
things got bad, the way Vi Hart did?23  Yes, Second Life and 
 
22. For discussions of technical power in virtual worlds, see generally 
JULIAN DIBBELL, MY TINY LIFE: CRIME AND PASSION IN A VIRTUAL WORLD 
(1998); GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF ONLINE WORLDS 
(2010); Joshua A.T. Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017 (2009); 
James Grimmelmann, Virtual Power Politics, in THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, 
GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 
2006); James Grimmelmann, Virtual Worlds as Comparative Law, 49 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 147 (2004) [hereinafter Grimmelman, Virtual Worlds as Com-
parative Law]; James Grimmelmann, Virtual World Feudalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 126 (2009); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Virtual(ly) Law: The 
Emergence of Law in LambdaMOO, 2 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1 
(1996); Nicolas Suzor, The Role of the Rule of Law in Virtual Communities, 25 
BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1817 (2010). 
23. See Hart, supra note 13 (“As for me, I’ll continue posting on my own 
RSS-enabled site and making my videos available as torrents, and maybe I’ll 
5
  
140 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:1 
PayPal changed the way their systems worked, but so what?  
Database entries only matter if they control your access to 
something that matters in the real world.  Technical power on-
ly has bite to the extent you use a software system—walk away 
from the keyboard and the software can’t follow. 
To understand where this argument goes wrong, consider 
what it suggests for our disappointed victims of technical pow-
er.  Marc Bragg didn’t need Second Life: he could have drawn a 
picture of Taessot on a napkin and continued to enjoy his imag-
inary property. Mailpile didn’t need PayPal; it could have 
drawn pictures of Benjamin Franklin on napkins and used 
those. You don’t need Facebook; just take a Sharpie to your liv-
ing-room wall. You don’t need YouTube for cute cat videos; just 
film your own damn cat. 
These suggestions are so unsatisfying because they miss 
the inherently social nature of social software.  The fun and the 
value of these systems come from sharing them with others.  
YouTube’s other users provide me with better cat videos than I 
could film for myself; Facebook tells me what my friends are 
actually up to, not just what I imagine they’re up to.  Countless 
online journalists use social platforms to publish their work. 
Virtual property in Second Life, like a domain name or like a 
LinkedIn account, is valuable only because it’s networked.  To 
withdraw from the network in which the property is embedded 
is to give up something of real value, however virtual the prop-
erty itself may be. 
This, then, is a point about social power: The person or en-
tity who controls the terms on which a community comes to-
gether enjoys authority over that community.  The threat to 
boot you from YouTube if you don’t accept Google+ comments 
isn’t just about cat videos: it’s also about the people who make 
and watch those cat videos.  The threat to boot you off of a 
mailing list isn’t just about the emails; it’s about your access to 
the other people on the mailing list.  The threat to boot you 
from eBay isn’t just about the stars next to your name; it’s 
about the community of people who know what those stars 
mean, who give those stars their meaning. 
 
follow in the footsteps of the many other prominent YouTubers who are mov-
ing discussion of their videos off YouTube.”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
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Facebook, for example, has a privacy problem the way al-
coholics have sobriety problems.  But it is Facebook’s users who 
enable its addiction to personal information.  Facebook’s soft-
ware exists in a constant state of flux; the user community 
built around that software is the source of stability.  Each time 
Facebook redesigns its sharing settings to be more profligate 
with users’ private lives, it subjects them to technical power.  
Each time users swallow hard and keep on using Facebook be-
cause their friends are there, they subject each other to social 
power.  They are trapped in a dysfunctional codependent rela-
tionship with Facebook—and with each other. 
This is the Cheers24 problem: you want to go where every-
body knows your name.  Leaving a social software platform 
means leaving a social network.  Whoever controls that net-
work has you locked in. It’s extraordinarily difficult for any in-
dividual user in a truly social medium to escape from policies 
she considers oppressive without giving up all the benefits of 
being in the same place as the rest of her social circle.  This too 
is a form of power: if no one wants to be the first to leave, no 
one will leave.  Whoever controls the agenda by which the 
community settles on the software it will use—like Facebook’s 
programmers pushing out an “improvement” to its “privacy” 
controls—can take advantage of this social power to confer 
technical power on himself or herself themselves. Wherever 
there is a software platform, there will be the potential for 
abuse.  Technical power is inescapable because it is inescapably 
social. 
 
III.      Anarchy 
 
There is no way to redesign the technologies of social soft-
ware so that technical power disappears, for the reason that it 
is the social power that gives the technical power its bite.25  We 
think of social software as being “social” because it enables so-
cial connections among users.  But it is also “social” because it 
 
24. Cheers (NBC television broadcast 1982-1993). 
25. For historical documentation of arguments for and against embed-
ding anarchist and libertarian values in software, see generally CRYPTO 
ANARCHY, CYBERSTATES, AND PIRATE UTOPIAS (Peter Ludlow ed., 2001) (collec-
tion of essays). 
7
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is socially constructed.  If I use a drawing program to doodle for 
my own amusement, no one else cares what software I use.  
But if you and I want to share our doodles, we need to agree on 
which software to use, which requires us to agree on what that 
software is. It does no good for me to post to doodle.ly26 while 
you are on Madoodle,27 not if we want to see each other’s work.  
Sharing a social medium requires running the same software.  
But it is this agreement—to interoperate at a technical level—
that creates the possibility for technical power.28 
Because it is rooted in human agreement rather than in 
any specific details of software, technical power can be surpris-
ingly tenacious.  What makes Facebook the Facebook we know 
and love/hate?  It’s not just Facebook the company and its con-
trol over a server farm and a domain name.  Facebook is also 
Facebook because its users choose to type “facebook.com” into 
their browsers—that is, to converge and coordinate on the Fa-
cebook software-mediated community. 
Even systems specifically designed to escape technical 
power run afoul of social power. Take Diaspora*.  Diaspora* is 
a peer-to-peer social network platform explicitly founded as an 
alternative to Facebook.29  It allows (and encourages) users to 
host their own Diaspora* servers and gives them the software 
under a free software license so they can configure their serv-
ers as they wish.30  Its developers explained, “Like the Internet 
itself, Diaspora* isn’t housed in any one place, and it’s not con-
trolled by any one entity (including us).”31 
What makes Diaspora* a coherent community?  Not the 
 
26. See DOODLE.LY, doodle.ly/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2014). 
27. See MADOODLE, http://madoodle.com/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
28. For further discussion of the link between interoperability and power 
on the Internet, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF 
CYBERSPACE (1999); JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND 
HOW TO STOP IT (2008). 
29. DIASPORA*, https://diasporafoundation.org (last visited Oct. 12, 
2014). 
30. See Notes on Installing and Running Diaspora, GITHUB  (Oct. 22, 
2013), https://github.com/jhass/old_diaspora_wiki/blob/master/Notes-on-
Installing-and-Running-Diaspora.md. 
31. Dan [Grippi] et al., Diaspora* Means a Brighter Future for Us All, 
THE DIASPORA PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2011), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20111002003516/http://blog.diasporafoundation.o
rg/2011/09/21/diaspora-means-a-brighter-future-for-all-of-us.html. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
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control over Diaspora* servers by one company, but rather the 
agreement to run a common set of software, with common pro-
tocols that interoperate in particular ways.  And so there is 
technical power here, too.  It resides in the current configura-
tion of the Diaspora* protocols and the common software, and 
it flows from the practical ability to push an “upgrade” out to a 
user community that will agree to run it. 
Or take Reddit. This “place friendly to thought, relation-
ships, arguments, and to those that wish to challenge those 
genres” has what seems like a gold-plated exit option to pre-
serve user freedom. Any user (or “redditor”) can create a new 
section of the site (or “subreddit”), automatically becoming its 
new moderator32 and establishing its rules.33  But the tale of its 
politics subreddit (“/r/Politics”) shows why that option is often 
unsatisfying. /r/Politics has over three million readers,34 and 
some of them became concerned in November 2013 about what 
they saw as the rightward political slant of the moderators.35  
The moderators kept a list of “banned domains” that produced 
“sensationalist titles” and “bad journalism”—a list that includ-
ed Salon, the Huffington Post, and Mother Jones.36  In explain-
ing why dissatisfied redditors didn’t simply depart for a more 
left-leaning political subreddit, one journalist and redditor 
wrote: 
 
First, let’s remember what’s at stake here: a vi-
brant community of three million subscribers.  So 
‘start another reddit’ is not a fair response to 
redditors who already built this community over 
most of a decade, only to watch it taken over and 
 
32. See Frequently Asked Questions, REDDIT, 
http://www.reddit.com/wiki/faq (last visited Oct. 15, 2014) (“If you create a 
subreddit you will automatically become its moderator.”). 
33. See id.  (“[M]oderators are free to run their subreddits however they 
so choose . . . .”). 
34. See /r/Politics, REDDIT (last visited Oct. 8, 2014), 
http://www.reddit.com/r/politics/. 
35. See Will Oremus, Reddit Moderators Apologize for Handling of “Bad 
Journalism” Ban, SLATE (Nov. 2, 2013, 3:11 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/11/01/reddit_politics_r_politics_
mods_ban_mother_jones_others_for_bad_journalism.html. 
36. See id. 
9
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locked down by amateur dictators.37 
 
What made /r/Politics worth fighting over—that “vibrant 
community of three million subscribers”—is also what made 
the fight necessary.  The great value of a subreddit is that red-
ditors are talking to each other rather than to themselves; if 
you split the community, you hurt it.  But once you have a sin-
gle community, someone has to be the moderator, and that 
someone has the power to determine which publications end up 
on the “banned” list. 
Not even Bitcoin,38 the libertarian peer-to-peer electronic 
currency “designed to allow people to buy and sell without cen-
tralized control by banks or governments,” can escape from the 
problem of social power wielded through technical means.39  
Consider, carefully, how Bitcoin works.  The global log of 
transactions is jointly maintained by users’ computers; distrib-
uted cryptography substitutes for centralized anti-forgery con-
trols.40  The supply of Bitcoins is controlled by a function em-
bedded in the cryptographic protocols, not by a single authority 
with the power to confiscate them or to make more.41 
But where do Bitcoin’s cryptographic rules come from?  Not 
from the mysterious “Satoshi Nakamoto” who originally de-
 
37. PJ Vogt, What It’s Like When Redditors Ban Your Interview About 
Redditors’ Content Bans, ON THE MEDIA (Nov. 1, 2013, 10:05 AM), (quoting 
Angela Motorman), http://www.onthemedia.org/story/what-its-when-
redditors-ban-your-interview-about-reddits-content-bans/. 
38. See Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
39. Thomas Lowenthal, Bitcoin: Inside the Encrypted, Peer-to-Peer Digi-
tal Currency, ARS TECHNICA (June 8, 2011, 9:00 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/bitcoin-inside-the-encrypted-
peer-to-peer-currency.ars.  See generally Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Inno-
vative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 160 (2011). 
40. See Lowenthal, supra note 39, at 1 (“The Bitcoin solution uses cryp-
tography and an open transaction register.  Whenever you spend a Bitcoin, 
you cryptographically sign a statement saying that you have transferred the 
coin to a new owner and you identify the new owner by their public crypto 
key. . . . As soon as a transaction takes place, the recipient (who has a very 
strong incentive to ensure that you don't spend the coin twice) publishes the 
transaction to the global Bitcoin network.”). 
41. See id. (“[Bitcoins] are created gradually according to a precise proto-
col in order to reward those who contribute and maintain the network, con-
trol the rate of creation of the currency, and maintain the integrity of the 
transaction list.”). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
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signed the protocol.42  Rather, as a practical fact, Bitcoin’s rules 
come from its users’ agreement to use specific compatible soft-
ware, and from their agreement about which transactions have 
actually happened.  Get enough users to agree on a different 
set of transactions and those transactions become the new 
Bitcoin reality.43  This isn’t just a theoretical possibility.  In 
March of 2013, users running different versions of the Bitcoin 
software disagreed on whether certain transactions had taken 
place.44  To resolve the disagreement, some developers tried to 
“convince a majority of the network’s miners to voluntarily 
downgrade their software.”45  It worked.46  Similar disputes 
happen all the time; indeed, the Bitcoin protocol’s stability de-
pends on community consensus to resolve them.47 
This is social power, and once again, it creates technical 
power.  If ninety-nine percent of Bitcoin users agree that they 
need to update their software to deal with a bug and that up-
date requires rolling back a day’s worth of transactions, then 
the one percent of Bitcoin traders who made a killing that day 
have just lost out to the others. If they update their software, 
they lose the Bitcoins they just made; if they don’t, those 
Bitcoins will be worthless because there will be no one to trade 
them with. Bitcoin has no coercive central banker, but it does 
have a coercive global banker embedded in the software, cho-
sen by the mass of users. 
Thus, while the God problem—the unilateral exercise of 
 
42. See id. 
43. See Ittay Eyal & Emin Gün Sirer, Majority is Not Enough: Bitcoin 
Mining Is Vulnerable (Dep’t of Computer Science, Cornell Univ., No. 
arXiv:1311.0243v5 [cs.CR], 2013), available at 
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1311.0243v5.pdf. 
44. See Timothy B. Lee, Major Glitch in Bitcoin Network Sparks Sell-Off; 
Price Temporarily Falls 23%, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 12, 2013, 12:05 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/business/2013/03/major-glitch-in-bitcoin-network-
sparks-sell-off-price-temporarily-falls-23/ (“A block was produced that the lat-
est version of the Bitcoin software, version 0.8, recognized as valid but that 
nodes still running version 0.7 or earlier rejected.”). 
45. Id. 
46. See Neil Fincham, What the Fork Was That? A Forking Post Mortem, 
MINE FOREMAN (Mar. 14, 2013), http://mineforeman.com/2013/03/14/what-
the-fork-was-that-a-forking-post-mortem/. 
47. See Ed Felten, Bitcoin Isn’t So Broken After All, FREEDOM TO TINKER 
(Nov. 7, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/bitcoin-isnt-so-
broken-after-all/. 
11
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technical power—is immediately dramatic, it exists because of 
the Cheers problem—the social lock-in from agreeing to use a 
common social software platform.  We can never completely get 
rid of technical power, and we can never make exiting any of 
these platforms completely costless.  To join a platform is to 
commit to its user community, and since technical change over 
time is inevitable, it means also committing to living with the 
consequences of technical decisions the community will make 
in the future. The social is technical, the technical is social, and 
both are always and forever political.48  Perfectly libertarian 
social software does not exist. 
 
IV.      State 
 
All is not lost.  It is possible to design software that makes 
it harder to misuse technical power.49  Harder, not impossible, 
but that is still something.  The heart of social power is the 
consensus to use particular software with a particular design.  
Technical decisions cannot thwart a group of users who have 
reached consensus from putting it into place—but can influence 
the agenda by which the group makes its decision on which 
software to use. 
A simple example is it that it matters whether changes to 
software can be made unilaterally by a single actor, or whether 
such changes require coordinated action by individual users.  
Facebook, for example, has immense agenda-setting power be-
cause it can simply update the software on its servers, auto-
matically changing the “Facebook” experience for everyone.50  
 
48. For further canonical discussions of the power and limits of exit op-
tions on the Internet, see generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and 
Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1398-1402 
(1996); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical 
View from Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 425-28 (2000); David G. 
Post, Against “Against Cyberanarchy”, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365, 1381-82 
(2002). 
49. See David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on 
Law-Making in Cyberspace (Article 3), J. ONLINE L. (1995). 
50. See Facebook: Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (“If you 
download or use our software, such as a stand-alone software product, an 
app, or a browser plugin, you agree that from time to time, the software may 
download and install upgrades, updates and additional features from us in 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
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Diaspora* is not immune from software change, but making a 
change requires persuading a critical mass of users to switch, 
since each user must make an individual decision to upgrade.51  
This won’t stop a majority of users from forcing an unwilling 
minority to upgrade or quit—but it is harder to persuade a ma-
jority of users than it is to persuade one individual.  On Dias-
pora*, the sheer force of social inertia protects users. 
At first glance, it seems as though we could protect users 
by locking a design in place for all time and giving no one at all 
the ability to modify the software.  Unfortunately, this ap-
proach—get the software right and then never change it—
doesn’t work, because technical power is secondary to social 
power.  Software is not self-executing, so if people agree to dis-
card a piece of software, no safeguards embedded in it will do 
any good.  The parties to a contract can rescind it; the partners 
in a partnership can dissolve it; the users of software can re-
place it. 
There are also strong practical reasons not to freeze code 
forever. Software is buggy, and users want someone to be able 
to fix bugs.  If Bitcoin’s current implementations can only pro-
cess seven transactions a second, its users will want to be able 
to upgrade the protocol’s capacity.52  But once we admit of that 
possibility, what counts as a “bug” and what counts as a “fea-
ture” is necessarily in the eye of the beholder.  Marc Bragg—
according to Second Life—took advantage of a bug to place ear-
ly and artificially low bids for virtual land.53 Leaving that bug 
unfixed could have broken the land-auction process for every-
one else.  But a Second Life that can roll back botched land 
auctions is a Second Life that can confiscate Bragg’s property 
without a hearing. 
The same goes for disagreements over how Bitcoin’s block-
 
order to improve, enhance, and further develop the software.”). 
51. See generally How Does Diaspora* Work?, DIASPORA*, 
https://diasporafoundation.org/about#host (last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
52. See Timothy B. Lee, Bitcoin Needs to Scale by a Factor of 1000 to 
Compete with Visa. Here’s How to Do It, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/11/12/bitcoin-
needs-to-scale-by-a-factor-of-1000-to-compete-with-visa-heres-how-to-do-it/. 
53. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595-97 
(E.D. Pa. 2007). 
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chain protocol54 should operate, or how to weigh redditors’ 
votes when moderating comments.  The necessity of change 
creates the possibility of oppression.  Software is a human con-
struct, made for social purposes; there is no such thing as per-
fect software, any more than there is a perfect human or a per-
fect society. 
Put another way, even software that never changes still 
creates technical power.  It freezes a specific set of rules and 
power relations in place for all time, favoring some tasks and 
users over others.  An electronic stock exchange that executes 
trades in the order they are received favors whoever can shave 
the most microseconds off the time it takes their sell orders to 
arrive.55  An Internet on which anonymity is easy and unmask-
ing is hard favors harassers over victims.56  Those who come 
out ahead under those rules may be disinclined to notice the 
technical power sustaining their advantages, but the power 
and the advantages are still there.  The computational is politi-
cal.57 
We return, therefore, to partial techniques that moderate 
power rather than eliminate it.  One is that having smaller 
communities with more competition among them makes it eas-
ier for users to threaten to leave.  The proliferation of subred-
dits makes redditors’ threats to start their own more credible.  
The moderators of /r/Politics still have technical and social 
power over it; those who depart still give something up.  But 
they give up less than those who leave Facebook do; the hur-
dles they must jump are lower.  The design of Reddit doesn’t 
prevent the moderators of a subreddit from behaving atrocious-
 
54. See Block Chain, BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block_chain 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2014). 
55. See Jerry Adler, Raging Bulls: How Wall Street Got Addicted to 
Light-Speed Trading, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/2012/08/ff_wallstreet_trading/all/. 
56. See Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501, 507 
(2013); James Grimmelmann, The Unmasking Option, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 23, 25-26 (2010). 
57. For discussion of the inevitability of contested decisions embedded in 
software, see Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Per-
spectives from Law, Computer Science, and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 583, 589-97  (2006); Clay Shirky, Social Software and the Poli-
tics of Groups, CLAY SHIRKY’S WRITINGS ABOUT THE INTERNET (Mar. 9, 2003), 
http://shirky.com/writings/group_politics.html. 
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ly; it just makes it harder to force users to hold still while they 
do. 
To generalize, distributed systems disperse social power; 
centralized systems concentrate it.  While the nature of social 
software means that no technical design can eliminate the need 
for agreement on some aspects of the design, some designs re-
quire greater agreement than others.  Facebook is a tightly 
coupled software system—more than one billion users58 experi-
ence it through exactly the same server software.  All one bil-
lion users must agree on what “Facebook” is, which gives Face-
book enormous, concentrated power. 
But other social-software systems are less tightly coupled; 
they are more tolerant of the possibility that people’s experi-
ences will be inconsistent.  Factoring web discussions among 
social platforms such as Digg, Reddit, Slashdot, Metafilter, and 
a million others means that it is no longer necessary for each to 
have the same software-imposed rules as the others.  This 
technical modularity creates social modularity: fewer people 
need to agree on what “Pinterest” or “Tumblr” is than on what 
“Facebook” is.  Reducing the need for agreement on each plat-
form reduces the degree of technical power that each platform 
possesses over its users. 
But dispersion comes at a distinctive cost: fragmentation.  
It was harder to travel from Antioch to London after the col-
lapse of the Roman Empire; the conversation about a photo-
graph splinters as it crosses from one site to another.  Conver-
sations on /r/Liberal59 and /r/Conservative60 and 
/r/Neutralpolitics61 take place in substantial isolation from each 
other.  There will always be a tradeoff between freedom and in-
teroperability in social software systems.62 And note carefully, 
the technical power is not gone. It has simply been placed in 
 
58. See Facebook: About, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
59. See /r/Liberal, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/liberal (last visited 
(Oct. 17, 2014). 
60. See /r/Conservative, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/Conservative 
(last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
61. See /r/Neutralpolitics, REDDIT, 
http://www.reddit.com/r/NeutralPolitics (last visited Oct. 17, 2014). 
62. James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2799, 2830 (2010). 
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more hands: a million mayors instead of a lone emperor.  The 
moderators of /r/Anarchism (52,643 readers)63 enjoy the same 
kind of technical power as the moderators of /r/Politics 
(3,085,888 readers).64  And, if /r/Postleftanarchism (803 read-
ers)65 is to be believed, they have abused that power. A mailing 
list moderator exercises the power to decide which messages 
she will forward to the list and which messages she will block, 
just as Facebook does.  A piranha’s teeth are as sharp as a 
shark’s. 
Another technique for checking technical power, one so 
frequently mentioned that it needs little elaboration, is trans-
parency.  The EdgeRank algorithms Facebook uses to decide 
which stories to show to users are proprietary, secret, and in-
scrutable.66  It is hard to detect censorship on Facebook, and 
even harder to prove.67  PayPal, at least, cannot freeze a user’s 
account without the freeze being obvious to the user—and thus 
open to public challenge.68  Bitcoin’s open-source implementa-
tion makes it accessible to users what the protocol does and 
does not do.69  This fact does not prevent one group of users 
from insisting on a change that hurts others, but it does make 
it harder: the consequences of a proposed change are visible in 
the proffered source code, which makes it easier to mobilize re-
sistance. 
 
V.      Utopia 
 
63. See /r/Anarchism, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/anarchism (last 
visited (Oct. 21, 2014). 
64. See /r/Politics, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/politics (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014). 
65. See /r/Postleftanarchism, REDDIT, 
http://www.reddit.com/r/postleftanarchism (last visited Oct. 8, 2014). 
66. Jeff Widman, EdgeRank, EDGERANK, http://edgerank.net/#What-is-
EdgeRank (last visited Oct. 21, 2014) (“Furthermore, Facebook keeps the al-
gorithm a secret, and they're constantly tweaking it.”). 
67. Arbitrary and Capricious, ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2014, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/08/facebook-
censorship (“Facebook censors operate under a cloak of anonymity, with no 
accountability to users.”). 
68. See Solving Problems with Your PayPal Account, PAYPAL 
https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/security/solve-problems (last visited 
Oct. 21, 2014) (“Has your PayPal account been limited or ‘frozen’?”). 
69. See Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, supra note 38 (“Bitcoin is 
fully open-source and is decentralized.”). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss1/5
  
2014 ANARCHY, STATUS UPDATES, AND UTOPIA 151 
 
Technical power is dangerous because it can be abused, not 
because it is bad in itself.  Facebook couldn’t “give people the 
power to share”70 without software and the technical power 
that comes with it.  PayPal, Second Life, Reddit, Bitcoin, 
YouTube, and all the other social software platforms that en-
rich online life use technical power to do great things for users.  
Rather, the fundamental problem with technical power is that 
it is unconstrained by the rule of law.71  Software itself can be 
almost perfectly rule-like—automatic, precise, consistent, and 
utterly indefatigable—but there is no way to make similar 
guarantees about the people who create the software.72 
It is deeply undemocratic, for example, for a government to 
make new rules in secret and impose them without warning or 
a chance to be heard.  And yet, that’s exactly what happens 
when a platform owner pushes out a new version of its software 
that takes away a feature users had come to take for granted.  
The handheld Nintendo 3DS comes with a stylus and a 
touchscreen, enabling users to run the Swapnote program to 
“create handwritten notes and then share those notes with oth-
er Swapnote users . . . from across the room . . .  or across the 
world.”73  But when Nintendo decided that some users were us-
ing Swapnote to “exchange offensive material[,]” it disabled the 
feature.74  No consultation, no vote, no warning, no appeal, no 
refund. Technical power can be wielded without any of the 
checks and balances that apply in any democracy worth its 
salt. 
The rule of law is a characteristic of a social institution, 
not of a technology.  When software treats users fairly, it is be-
 
70. Facebook: About, supra note 58. 
71. For discussions of software and the rule of law, see generally Dan-
ielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 
(2007); James Grimmelmann, Sealand, HavenCo, and the Rule of Law, 2012 
U. ILL. L. REV. 405; James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 
YALE L.J. 1719 (2005) [hereinafter Grimmelman, Regulation by Software]; Mi-
chael Risch, Virtual Rule of Law, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
72. See Grimmelman, Regulation by Software, supra note 71, at 1735. 
73. What Is Swapnote?, NINTENDO, http://swapnote.nintendo.com (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
74. Notice About Service for Nintendo 3DS Software Swapnote, 
NINTENDO, http://www.nintendo.com/whatsnew/detail/UHQZFP2Jxcll_Vm-
PsZpxNIK5920bRRK (last visited Oct. 31, 2013). 
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cause the programmers and system administrators behind it 
are committed to treating users fairly.  Those commitments 
don’t just happen.  They arise when the programmers care 
about making their online spaces vibrant, safe, fair, and just, 
and the programmers care when users care.  Some administra-
tors will share users’ values and act on them; others will be 
afraid of what will happen if they don’t.  But either way, the 
culture of the rule of law must come from users.  The users are 
the relevant political community entitled to make policy for 
themselves. They are the ones who can hold platform providers 
truly accountable. They are the ones who best understand the 
norms and values of their communities. They are the ones with 
a deep and personal stake in the success of those communities.  
They are the ones in a position to weigh the costs and the bene-
fits to their community of different rules: to decide, for exam-
ple, whether the platform should be relatively more tolerant of 
wide-ranging debate or relatively more protective of its users 
from abuse. 
In the end, following extensive debate within /r/Politics, its 
moderators apologized, added an FAQ, and reopened consider-
ation of each and every banned domain.75  Whether you see 
them as foiled right-wing plotters or as overworked public 
servants, the debates that led them to change course look like 
deliberative democracy in action.76  If the essence of the rule of 
law is that the government has guns and doesn’t use them, 
/r/Politics comes off looking good.  Whether by force or by force 
of argument, its moderators were persuaded not to use the 
technical power everyone agreed they possessed.77 
One last example.  In 2007, Digg78 users repeatedly posted 
a 32-digit hexadecimal number—an encryption key for HD-
DVDs.  Digg’s administrators initially complied with Digital 
 
75. See Oremus, supra note 35. 
76. For a discussion of online spaces as deliberative communities, see A. 
Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 867-71 
(2003); James Grimmelmann, Virtual Borders: The Interdependence of Real 
and Virtual Worlds, 11 FIRST MONDAY 2 (2006), 
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1312/1232. 
77. For an argument that social-software-mediated groups are always 
engaged in a project of self-definition via debate, see Shirky, supra note 1. 
78. DIGG, http://digg.com/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
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Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”)79 takedown notices from 
the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”), which 
sparked an outcry from Digg users.  After a long night of the 
soul, Digg co-founder Kevin Rose posted a note: 
 
But now, after seeing hundreds of stories and 
reading thousands of comments, you’ve made it 
clear.  You’d rather see Digg go down fighting 
than bow down to a bigger company.  We hear 
you, and effective immediately we won’t delete 
stories or comments containing the code and will 
deal with whatever the consequences might be.80 
 
In the end, the MPAA quietly backed down.  The moral of 
the story is not that Digg’s software worked, but that its poli-
tics worked.  Right or wrong, its users collectively made a deci-
sion and acted on it. 
What Digg and Reddit had that PayPal and YouTube 
lacked was not just a conscientious administrator in a position 
of power, but also a user community that cared about how that 
power was wielded.  The values that good administrators act on 
are the values of their communities.  Good administrators 
online, like good governments offline, explain their policies, 
give fair warning whenever possible, seek comments and feed-
back on changes, and are ultimately accountable to those they 
serve. The technical power is still present, but its use is 
checked, less visibly and less formally, by the social power be-
hind it. 
The rule of law will come to social software when We the 
Users insist on it. 
 
 
79. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
80. Kevin Rose, Digg This: 09-f9-11-02-9d-74-e3-5b-d8-41-56-c5-63-56-
88-c0, DIGG THE BLOG (May 1, 2007), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070504054516/http://blog.digg.com/?p=74. 
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